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Workfow Management Systems (WFMS) are concerned with the control and coordination
of operational business processes, called workflows. When workflow technology is deployed
in domains where processes have simple coordinative requirements, the flow of control and
data may be easily mapped onto process effectiveness. With the diversity of resources,
subjects and activities in the system, ensuring a secure execution environment of the workflow
becomes a critical issue. In this paper, we are interested in deploying aWFMS security policy.
We investigate this issue either within intra or inter organizational workflows. The later case
is more complex and requires more sophisticated control since it includes communications
between different organizations.
Keywords: WFMS, OrBAC, Security Policy.
1 Introduction
A workflow is a process consisting of several tasks to be executed by enforcing specific
constraints. WFMS are based on representing processes as workflows. The different tasks
composing a workflow are interdependent and are communicating control information and
data to each other. This means that access control must be synchronized with progression
of the workflow execution. In addition, the execution of a task is related to the execution of
precedent tasks. So an access control model is needed. On the other hand, workflow tasks
can be executed within the same organization or within different ones. In the first case,
the workflow security is controlled by the same organization which has the authority to
manage the security of its different subjects and their interactions and to control the access
to its different objects. In the case of different organizations, more complex management
is necessary to ensure a secure execution of the workflow. Security requirements are not
limited to access control but also include flow control to manage interactions between
different components of the WFMS. If a piece of information Info flows from a role R1 to
another role R2 of the same or different organization, we must be sure that R2 has privilege
allowing it to get an access to Info. If R2 must not access to Info and R1 transmits the
information Info to R2, a leakage of information occurs. The problem is known as the
“confinement problem” [WEB96, WEB] and requires a flow control model to solve it. So,
a workflow specification must be associated with a security policy which takes into account
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access control and information flow control simultaneously. Since a workflow execution
implies interaction between different entities, how to deploy a security policy becomes a
critical issue. Either with a centralized or distributed workflow, we have to define different
responsibilities of different workflow entities to enforce the whole security of the workflow
execution.
Many research works have been interested in WFMS security but no study has ad-
dressed the deployment part. Several proposals [NAH98, VA96, PH99, EB99] suggest
different access control models to manage security in WFMS without defining how to
implement such a policy. They have only defined a centralized procedure that controls
the execution of the workflow. [VA96, NAH98] propose a conceptual and a logical model
WAM (Workflow Authorization Model) to enforce the authorization flow based on the
inter-dependencies between tasks using colored and temporized petri nets. Hung and Kar-
lapalem [PH99] have presented an authorization model for WFMS that addresses three
security properties: integrity, authorization and availability. [EB99] studies authoriza-
tions in WFMS considering different constraints. In this work, Bertino describes the
specification and enforcement of authorization constraints in workflow management sys-
tems. This work enumerates and defines possible configurations that satisfy the workflow
execution and associated constraints. But it does not show how a manager must proceed
to deploy the workflow without violating its constraints. Also, it does not consider the
inter-organizational case where many organizations can interoperate to achieve a common
objective. These works suppose the existence of a central entity responsible for specifying
and managing the workflow security policy without showing how such a policy will be
used. They do not deal with the communications required to apply the workflow security
policy. Also, they do not show how this security policy can be dynamically supervised
during the workflow execution.
In this paper, using an access and flow control based on the OrBAC model [SAC07],
we present an approach to deploy a security policy either in intra or in inter workflows.
This work actually focuses on how to manage the workflow security policy. It answers to
the following questions: Who defines the workflow security policy? Who is responsible
for maintaining a secure execution environment? Who has permission to manage the
workflow security policy? The paper introduces PEP and PDP entities required to deploy
the security policy within the workflow. We show how these entities have to communicate
with workflow components in order to synchronize and manage the security policy. In
[SAC08] a workflow security policy is modelled and specified jointly with the workflow
specification. We show in this paper how to deploy a workflow policy and how it must
be applied to different components of the workflow. The deployment depends necessarily
on the execution mode and type of the workflow (intra or inter organizational workflow).
Then we exemplify the inter-organizational case through the telesurgery application.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the workflow management
systems and their intra or inter organizational types. Section 3 presents provisioning and
outsourcing approaches to manage security policy within a workflow. Section 4 shows
different WFMS policy requirements. Section 5 explains how to define the security policy
associated to WFMS and how to use the OrBAC model for this purpose in both intra
and inter organizational cases. Section 6 specifies our approach to deploy a security policy
either in intra or inter organizational workflow. Then, in section 7, we exemplify the inter-
organizational case through a telesurgery application. Section 8 concludes the paper and
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outlines future work.
This paper is extended version of [SAC09], especially section 7 is new.
2 Workflow Management Systems
A workflow is a representation of a process. This process is divided into many tasks having
inter-dependent executions. The execution of these different tasks may include temporal
constraints or conditions. We can actually suppose different manners to constrain tasks
execution: two tasks may be executed in sequential, parallel or concurrent mode. A
workflow is composed of two phases: a building phase and an execution phase. The first
phase defines the formal representation of the process. The second one is an instantiation
of the workflow which is based on the specification defined in the first phase.
A WFMS is a system which supports the specification, control, coordination and ad-
ministration of processes using workflows. This is done through the execution of a software
which is based on the workflow structure. WFMSs are used in different domains: research,
industry, commerce, etc. WFMSs may include sensitive resources and potentially mali-
cious subjects when managing and executing different workflows. This introduces the need
to care about security in these systems.
Tasks of a workflow may be executed by the same subject or by different ones having
different roles that need to access to different resources of the system. Tasks must be
executed by authorized subjects and according to their execution order specification. In
addition, subjects must have access only to authorized objects during the time of task
execution. Thus, granting or revoking privileges must be synchronized with the workflow
execution progress. All these requirements lead us to combine the specification of the
workflow and the security policy associated with it. This security policy must ensure
many properties: integrity, authorization, availability, confidentiality, authentication and
separation of duty.
2.1 Centralized and distributed workflows
A WFMS can be executed either in centralized or distributed modes. With a centralized
control, there exists a single central WFMS which is responsible for (1) distributing the
tasks to the appropriate agents, and (2) ensuring the task dependencies by sending the
tasks to the respective agents only when all requisite conditions are satisfied. This entity
has a whole view of the workflow. It is the initiator of the workflow and it evaluates
execution results in order to choose the next agent to whom it will send the next task. In
this mode, workflow agents do not know the dependencies between each other.
In the distributed execution mode the whole workflow is sent by the initiator to the
first agent A1. After the execution of the first task associated with the agent A1, A1
evaluates the dependencies with its successors. The rest of the workflow is then sent to
the valid successor depending on the result of the first task. Finally the last agent sends
the final result to the central entity which initiated the workflow. In this mode, workflow
agents know the different dependencies with other agents. Especially, each agent knows its
successors and conditions that are needed to transit from a task to another. Also different
constraints defined with the workflow specification are ensured by different agents which
have to check if they are respecting workflow constraints when executing different tasks.
These two modes are represented in figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Centralized and distributed workflow
Fig. 2: Inter-organizational workflow
2.2 Intra and inter organizational workflows
Workflow tasks can be executed within the same organization or within different ones. We
respectively call these cases intra and inter organizational workflows. Intra-organizational
workflows are simpler to manage since all process requirements (resources, subjects...) be-
long to the same organization. In the inter-organizational case, specific requirements are
needed. Figure 2 represents an inter-organizational workflow. Tasks of this workflow be-
long to three different organizations (ORGA, ORGB and ORGC). These tasks can belong
or not at the same time to other local workflows in their own organizations. As a functional
requirement, the execution of an inter organizational workflow needs synchronization be-
tween the execution of different sub-workflows that participate in the collaboration. As
a security requirement, we have to deal with interactions between these different organi-
zations. The execution of an intra-organizational workflow can be either centralized or
distributed as it is explained in section 2.1. The execution of inter-organizational work-
flows can be considered distributed since each sub-workflow is executed within an inde-
pendent organization. But the coordination between these different organizations can be
done either by these organizations themselves (distributed mode) or through a central en-
tity which deals with the synchronization and the orchestration of different sub-workflows
(centralized mode).
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3 WFMS security policy management
Functionally, the central entity of a workflow can be either a coordinator entity which
controls the whole execution of the workflow in a centralized workflow or just an initiator
entity in a distributed workflow. This entity will be also responsible for the security of
the workflow. For this aspect, a choice must be done by the workflow administrator, i.e.
the security requirements may be managed either using an outsourcing approach or a
provisioning approach.
3.1 Outsourcing approach
In this approach, the central entity of the workflow is also responsible for the workflow
security. Figure 3 represents this approach within a centralized and distributed workflow.
Arrows in this figure show different communications during the workflow execution. We
notice that access to the security policy is only done by the WFC (Workflow Coordinator).
Using this approach, workflow agents have to ask for permissions to execute workflow tasks
to the central entity. This central entity has to check if the agent is authorized to execute
the task depending on the workflow security policy and the workflow specification which
includes workflow constraints. Even if the execution of the workflow is distributed, the
central entity will need all information required about the execution progression when it is
asked for a permission by workflow agents. The security policy is managed by the central
entity. The different worklow agents do not have any knowledge about it. They have just
the obligation to ask for a permission to execute requested workflow tasks. The central
entity synchronizes the security policy with the execution progression of the workflow.
3.2 Provisioning approach
In the provisioning approach, the central entity delegates the workflow security require-
ments to different agents. So, if an agent needs to execute a workflow task it will not ask
permission to the central entity but it will search it from a security server. This check is
done by all workflow agents. This approach reduces the bulk on the central entity but it in-
creases the execution time on the workflow agents. Figure 4 represents this approach with
a centralized and a distributed workflow. Arrows in this figure show different communica-
tions during the workflow execution. We notice that access to the security policy is done
by workflow agents. With this approach the central entity has no security functionalities.
It does not deal with the security part which is managed by agents.
Fig. 3: Outsourcing in a centralized and a distributed workflow
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Fig. 4: Provisioning in a centralized and a distributed workflow
4 WFMS security policy requirements
4.1 Workflow constraints
A workflow specification is correlatively related to a set of constraints which complete the
workflow definition. These constraints can concern either workflow tasks or subjects or
roles that execute these tasks. We classify workflow constraints into two classes: static
constraints and dynamic constraints.
Static constraints This type of constraints can be evaluated during the user role as-
signment time. This type includes the separation and binding of duties principles.
Definition 1: SC is the set of static constraints of a workflow. SC is composed of atoms
and rules. If Ti, Tj and Tk are workflow tasks and Si is a subject belonging to the workflow
and ci is a workflow constraint then:
ci ∈ SC⇔ ci ∈ {same_subject(Ti, Tj), different_subject(Ti, Tj),must_execute(Si, Tj),execute(Si,
Tj)→¬must_execute(Si, Tk)}
The interpretation of this set of constraints is given below:
• Tasks Ti and Tj must be executed by the same subject
• Tasks Ti and Tj must be executed by different subjects
• Task Tj must be executed by subject Si
• If Si executes task Tj then it must not execute task Tk
Dynamic constraints Dynamic constraints have to be evaluated during the execution
time. Once the workflow execution starts, the workflow manager has to survey it in
order to control the consistency of dynamic constraints. This type of constraints includes
essentially temporal constraints.
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Definition 2: TC is the set of temporal constraints of a workflow. TC is composed of
atoms and rules. If Ti, Tj and Tk are workflow tasks and ci is a workflow constraint then:
ci ∈ TC⇔ ci ∈ { Start_Before(Ti, Tj), Start_With(Ti, Tj), End_Before(Ti, Tj), End_With(Ti,
Tj) }
The interpretation of these constraints is:
• Task Ti must start before task Tj
• Tasks Ti and Tj must start at the same time
• Tasks Ti must end before task Tj
• Tasks Ti and Tj must end at the same time
Another type of these constraints results from the workflow specification itself. A condi-
tional execution in the workflow specification is interpreted as a dynamic constraint. An
example of these constraints is: If Ti has been executed then execute Tj otherwise, execute
Tk.
4.2 OrBAC in brief
To define a WFMS policy and its secure execution environment, we suggest using the
OrBAC model. Thus, before presenting how to manage the security policy associated
with the workflow execution, we first briefly recall basic concepts suggested in the OrBAC
model.
In order to specify a security policy, the OrBAC model [AAeKT03, FCM04b] defines
several entities and relationships. It first introduces the concept of organization which is
central in OrBAC. An organization is any active entity that is responsible for managing a
security policy. Each organization can define its proper policy using OrBAC. Then, instead
of modelling the policy by using the concrete implementation-related concepts of subject,
action and object, the OrBAC model suggests reasoning with the roles that subjects,
actions or objects are assigned to in an organization. The role of a subject is simply called
a role as in the RBAC model. The role of an action is called activity and the role of
an object is called view. Each organization can then define security rules which specify
that some roles are permitted or prohibited to carry out some activities on some views.
Moreover, an organization can be composed of several sub organizations, each one having
its own policy. It is also possible to define a generic security policy in the root organization.
Its sub organizations will inherit from its security policy. Also, they can add or delete
some rules and so, define their proper policy. The definition of an organization and the
hierarchy of its sub organizations facilitate the administration [FCM04a]. The security
rules do not apply statically but their activation may depend on contextual conditions
[CCB]. For this purpose, the concept of context is explicitly included in OrBAC. Contexts
are used to express different types of extra conditions or constraints that control activation
of rules expressed in the access control policy. So, using a formalism based on first order
logic, security rules are specified using a 6-places predicate.
Definition 3: an OrBAC security rule is defined as: security_rule (type, organization,
role, activity, view, context) where type ∈ {permission, prohibition, obligation}. An
example of this security rule can be: security_rule (permission, a_hosp, nurse, consult,
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medical_record, urgency) meaning that, in organization a_hosp, a nurse is permitted to
consult a medical record in the context of urgency.
From an abstract policy, we can then derive a concrete policy that applies to subject,
action and object using the following OrBAC predicates:
• empower(org, subject, role): means that in organization org, subject is assigned to
role.
• consider(org, action, activity): means that in organization org, action is considered
an implementation of activity.
• use(org, object, view): means that in organization org, object is used in view.
5 WFMS security policy specification
5.1 Intra-organizational workflows
To specify the workflow security policy we use the OrBAC model. Using constraints
defined with the workflow specification, the security server defines the different contexts of
security rules. These contexts make the security policy dynamic and synchronized with the
workflow execution. Workflow constraints are either static or dynamic as shown in section
4.1. In OrBAC, there are built-in contexts to define such constraints. Prerequisite context
aims to restrict or extend privileges granted to a role depending on some conditions. So,
this context category is useful in WFMS to specify constraints associated with the workflow
process execution. The provisional context depends on previous actions the subject has
performed in the system, i.e. it corresponds to a history of execution. Provisional contexts
are very interesting in the domain of WFMS since the execution of a task depends on the
history of execution of precedent tasks. Also, it permits the definition of a dynamic
security policy according to contexts, a very useful requirement in WFMS. Using the
workflow specification the policy server specifies an abstract policy of the workflow. Such
a policy is based on roles, activities, views and contexts. Until now, the policy does not
deal with the instantiation of the workflow. This policy is defined within the organization
where the workflow process will be executed.
5.2 Inter-organizational workflows
For inter-organizational workflows, several workflows are involved in the achievement of a
common objective. Interactions between different organizations are necessary in this case.
Such communications have to be well controlled since each organization has its private
information, its private policy and its own characteristics. A communication protocol
is needed in order to ensure these different communications and flows that can transit
from an organization to another. This requirement is critical especially to enforce the
constraints defined with the workflow specification (see section 4.1).
If these constraints are defined within the same organization, the WFC can enforce
and check if its user role assignment violates the base of constraints or not. Otherwise,
if we suppose for example a constraint that specifies that task Ti must start before task
Tj and that task Ti is provided by an organization OrgA and task Tj is provided by an
organization OrgB, enforcing workflow constraints becomes more complicated. Indeed,
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synchronization of tasks between different organizations must be done in order to enforce
constraints.
5.2.1 Creation of VO
For both types of constraints, we need to create a virtual organization (VO) in order
to synchronize execution of tasks between different organizations and to enforce different
workflow constraints. The VO is responsible for the secure inter-organizational commu-
nications. To create a VO, the inter-organizational workflow coordinator (IWFC) sends
requests to different organizations participating in the global workflow. Receiving these
requests inviting them to join the VO, WFCs have to answer the IWFC to inform it about
their decision to participate in the VO. Once the agreement is achieved, the WFCs must
communicate to the IWFC information about their local workflow. They must especially
inform the IWFC about the constraint base. This piece of information includes the user
task and the role user assignment that the WFC had defined within its organization. So,
each organization orgI sends to the IWFC a set defined as: {(Ti, Ri, Ui), ICi}. The
first triple means that the user Ui is assigned to the role Ri to execute the task Ti. The
second argument is the set of inter-organizational constraints defined within the organi-
zation orgI. This set includes constraints defined within the organization orgI and having
dependencies with other organizations. Receiving these pieces of information, the IWFC
will have a global vision of all organizations. So, the IWFC has to check the consistency
of global workflow constraints. The IWFC verifies if the different assignments received
from different organizations violate or note the set of inter-organizational constraints of
the global workflow. If an inconsistency is detected, the IWFC transmits the information
to organizations concerned with this inconsistency. These organizations have to re-assign
a new user to the role and task causing the conflict. Then this new assignment is sent to
the IWFC who checks again the inter-organizational set of constraints. These communica-
tions between the IWFC and different organizations continue until obtaining a consistent
inter-organizational constraints base.
5.2.2 VO security policy
Based on the different constraints that the IWFC gathers, it has to define a coordination
security policy and to administrate it in order to ensure the non violation of the con-
straints during the workflow execution. To define its policy, the IWFC must transform
the constraints base into a set of security rules. These security rules constitute the inter-
organizational policy of the global workflow. To communicate to each other, organizations
have to be controlled by this policy. Most workflow constraints are based on tasks of the
workflow and subjects executing these tasks. So, the VO has to manage the transition of
subjects from an organization to another. The VO security policy must be consistent with
the different local security policies of organizations. Also, it must have a higher priority
than local policies.
For example, let us consider the following constraint: “Task T2 of organization OrgA
and task T4 of organization OrgB must be executed by the same subject.” The IWFC
can receive this constraint either from the OrgA or from the OrgB. These organizations
know about the inter-organizational constraints that they must satisfy but they do not
know how to ensure such a type of constraint. Indeed, each organization does not have the
security policy of the other organization. So, a third part, which is the VO, is responsible
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for managing this communication. The subject who will execute the task T2 into the
organization OrgA can have a different role when executing the task T4. We suppose
that Alice is the subject who will execute these tasks. Thus, for these two tasks, OrgA
and OrgB can respectively define these rules and role assignments in their local security
policies:
security_rule(permission, OrgA, clerk, sign, check, nominal).
empower (OrgA, Alice, clerk).
security_rule(permission, OrgB, manager, validate, mission, nominal).
empower (OrgB, Alice, manager):-
empower (OrgA, Alice, clerk),
security_rule(permission,OrgA, clerk, sign, check, nominal).
To be sure that the subject Alice is executing the task T2 of OrgA, the WFC2 has to
inform the IWFC about the execution progress of its workflow. Such a communication
allows the IWFC to update its security policy and its different contexts. Indeed, if we
suppose that when the task T2 will be executed, Alice will not be ready to perform the
task, the WFC2 will be obliged to change the subject executing the task and must inform
the IWFC about this change.
So, to enforce the constraint above, Alice has to switch from the role clerk within
the organization OrgA to the role manager within the organization OrgB. This transition
may imply a leakage of information. The problem is more dangerous if Alice transfers
a confidential or sensitive data. This confinement problem has to be managed using an
information flow control policy managed by the VO. To define this policy, we are based on
the information flow control model DTE (Domain and Type Enforcement) [LB95, KW03].
An integrated model based on OrBAC model and using a DTE approach is presented in
[SAC07]. Let us define the entities that this model introduces.
Definition 4: (domain) S is a set of all system subjects (active entities). S is divided into
equivalence classes. Each class represents a domain D including a set of subjects having
the same role in the system.
Definition 5: (type) O is a set of all system objects (passive entities). O is divided into
equivalence classes. Each class represents a type T including a set of objects having the
same integrity properties in the system.
Definition 6: (Entry Point) An entry point is a program or an activity which must be
executed to pass from a domain D1 to a domain D2, denoted EP(D1, D2) or EP1,2. An
entry point implies two rules: (1) subjects passing from D1 to D2 obtain a set of privileges
depending on the entry point they execute, (2) subjects passing from D1 to D2 lose all
their D1 privileges.
The first rule means that an entry point defines the set of privileges that subjects will
obtain when moving from a domain D1 to a domain D2. These privileges are included into
or equal to the set of privileges that D2 subjects have. Each domain can have more than
one entry point. The execution of these different entry points implies different privilege
sets. The second rule means that if a subject leaves a domain it cannot return to it only
by executing one of its entry points.
To be consistent with the OrBACmodel, a domain corresponds, within an organization,
to a role. The entry points to a domain correspond to different roles assigned temporarily
to a subject which does not belong to the organization where this role is defined. Thus,
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to define its security policy, the IWFC sends a request to different organizations to get
their entry points to their different roles (i.e. domains). Then the IWFC security policy
is a set of rules defined as: security_rule(permission, VO, Di, Enter, Dj , through(Ei, j))
IWFC rules are specified as specific OrBAC rules. The rule above expresses the transi-
tion between the domainDi belonging to an organization Orgi to the domainDj belonging
to an organization Orgj and uses the entry point concept to define a new context in order
to preserve secure information flows and to keep DTE concepts. Therefore, to consider this
particular rule we suppose the following hypotheses: (1) the source domain is considered
a role in the OrBAC rule, (2) the destination domain is considered a view in the OrBAC
rule, (3) the transition between two domains can be expressed as an OrBAC activity since
the basic meaning of this specific rule is to handle interactions between domains. For
this purpose, we define the OrBAC Enter activity, (4) the entry point defines the manner
to enter into a domain. Thus, an entry point can be included into a specific context in
an OrBAC rule denoted Through(Ei,j). This context specifies that the rule is valid only
through the Ei,j execution.
Through(Ei, j) context it is a composed context defined by an organization Orgj as
Through(Ei,j) = {Ei,j , Prj , coming_from(Orgi)}. The first argument represents the
activity to execute to enter a domain. The second argument gives the set of privileges
that will be granted to the subject who intends to enter a domain Dj when coming
from a domain Di. This set of privileges depends on the activity executed to enter the
domain. Since the entry points can also depend on different organizations from where
subjects are coming, we define the last argument coming_from(Orgi). For example, let
us suppose that we have two organizations Orgj and Orgk which define a role secretary.
If two subjects having this role and coming respectively from Orgj and Orgk need to
move to a role clerk in the organization Orgi, they will not get the same set of privileges
even if they execute the same entry point. This results from different sensitivity degrees
of different organizations and also from the relationship between the organizations. For
instance a special privilege can be granted to subjects coming from an organization and
moving to an organization with which some agreement has been established. This context
can be composed with other OrBAC contexts. Then it may include extra conditions and
circumstances to supervise the flow control.
The communication between different WFCs and the IWFC are considered secure and
all organizations are considered belonging to the same trust alliance. If it was not the
case, the policy of the IWFC would be much more complicated and more dynamic. All
communications have to transit through a trust server to communicate information about
actual status and about the local worflows progress.
6 Deploying WFMS security policy
With the diversity of resources, roles and tasks in a workflow, the deployment of a WFMS
security policy becomes a critical issue. In this section we show how to manage such a
security policy either in an intra or inter organizational workflow. The second case is more
complex since it deals with different communications between organizations cooperating
to execute the global workflow. We use OrBAC to specify our security policy. As shown
above, this model is able to represent confinement aspect using the organization concept.
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6.1 Intra-organizational case
The deployment of the security policy depends on the execution mode of the workflow
and on the approach that we are using to manage the policy. For the intra-organizational
case, we suppose that we deal with a distributed workflow. In a centralized workflow,
all communications in the workflow are done through the workflow coordinator (WFC).
Figure 5 represents a general scheme for deploying a WFMS security policy using the
outsourcing approach. The explanation in this section follows the numbers on the arrows
in the figure.
6.1.1 Specification environment
As shown in figure 5, the general scheme is divided into a specification environment and
an enactment environment.
(1) The definition of the workflow specification takes place. The process designer
provides a written or a graphic specification of the different tasks of the workflow and of
the roles that have to execute these tasks. Also, the designer defines different constraints
associated with the workflow definition.
(2) Different specification components are transmitted to a modelling tool. Petri nets
are an efficient tool to model workflows. Aside representing the workflow evolution, Petri
nets can take into account temporal constraints that may be defined with the workflow.
With Petri nets, it is possible to specify that the execution of activities must be done
in sequence, or in parallel, or that a choice has to be made between activities (alterna-
tive activities), or that certain activities need to be executed more than once (iterative
activities). An approach using Petri nets to represent workflows is explained in [SAC08].
(3) Once the workflow is modelled, the process modelling tool communicates with
a process verification engine to check if the workflow is well formed. If the workflow
is modelled using Petri nets, there are Petri nets properties (correctness, liveness, well-
structuredness, soundness, . . . ) that must hold to conclude that the workflow is well
defined and specified.
(4) Once the workflow is well formed, workflow constraints are checked. Constraints
validation engine checks the consistency of constraints defined with the workflow specifi-
cation.
(5) The policy server has to get information about the workflow specification, so that
the security policy can be specified. Thus, the process modelling tool transmits work-
flow information (roles, tasks, objects, constraints) to the server policy. Based on these
elements, the policy server specifies the workflow security policy to be used to ensure a
secured execution of the workflow.
(6) The OrBAC API creates the workflow security policy and saves it into a policy
repository (PR). This policy is an abstract policy which is based on abstract entities
defined in the OrBAC model. From this abstract policy saved in the PR, a concrete
policy will be derived when the workflow is instantiated. This policy is defined with
non active contexts. These contexts contain initial constraints defined with the workflow
specification. With the progression of the workflow execution, these contexts are updated
and activated in order to make the security rules applicable. The process modelling tool
provides the workflow specification to the process enactment engine. Then we move to
the enactment environment.
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6.1.2 Enactment environment
It manages the workflow instantiation. In this environment the workflow specification
moves to the run time phase. The user assignment is done at this phase depending
on the workflow specification. The steps below define the next phases to be done once
the workflow specification is ready. In this section, we actually present a decentralized
approach to execute the workflow. Regarding the security part, the outsourcing approach
is used. So, the WFC is responsible for the security of the workflow execution. To manage
the security policy, the WFC needs a PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) in order to deal
with different policy instances. This logical entity is responsible for controlling access
to different system resources. Before starting the workflow execution, the WFC has to
know how to manage the workflow security policy. So, communications with the policy
server are initiated. On the side of the policy server, there is a PDP (Policy Decision
Point) who is responsible for communicating with the security client and for replying to
its different requests. When a user tries to access a file or other resource on a computer
network or server that uses policy-based access management, the PEP will describe the
user’s attributes to other entities in the system. The PEP will ask the PDP whether or
not to authorize the user based on the description of the user’s attributes.
(7) In the process enactment engine, the WFC entity deals firstly with the assignment
of users to different roles and tasks. This assignment is based on a communication with
different users and external applications that can participate to the workflow execution.
(8) The assignment made by the WFC must be checked with respect to the workflow
constraints. Such an assignment must not make the constraint base inconsistent. So the
process enactment engine has to communicate with the constraints validation engine to
validate its assignment and to apply it.
(9) The PEP sends a request to the PDP. The request must contain information about
the assignment of users to different tasks and the different contexts of the workflow execu-
tion. Then, the PDP receives the request. This logical entity or place on a server makes
admission control and policy decisions in response to a request to access system resources.
(10) After receiving concrete entities and information about the workflow execution,
the PDP communicates with the PIE (Policy Instantiation Engine) to ask for the concrete
policy.
(11) The PIE is responsible for generating a concrete security policy based on infor-
mation received from the PDP and the abstract policy saved in the PR. The PIE updates
contexts and transfers the new security policy to the PDP.
(12) The PDP takes the policy decision. Whenever it receives a new policy instance,
i.e. a concrete rule (permission or prohibition), a PDP has to map this piece of informa-
tion onto concrete actions to push the new policy into the PEPs. Thus, the PDP has to
be aware of the PEPs capabilities, so that it can translate the security rules into generic
configurations and then the generic configurations into specific configurations, considering
the implementation of the PEP. So, the PDP translates the concrete policy into a trans-
latable language and stores it into a PIB (Policy Information Base). Applicable policies
are stored on the system and are analyzed by the PDP.
(13) The PDP makes and returns the decision. The PEP will let the user know whether
or not he or she has been authorized to access the requested resource.
(14) The PEP sends an acknowledgment to the PDP to inform about its acceptance
of the PDP decision and how it will apply it.
13
Samiha Ayed and Nora Cuppens-Boulahia and Frederic Cuppens
(15) Once the workflow specification and a consistent policy has been defined, the
WFC initiates the workflow. It sends the whole specification to the first agent that will
execute the first task of the workflow. Since this workflow execution is distributed, each
agent responsible for executing a task, sends a request to the WFC in order to grant him
the authorization to accomplish the task. These requests are represented by blue arrows
in figure 5. When the WFC receives such a request, it takes the decision to accept the
accesses. Then, it sends a response to the workflow agent including the permission or
prohibition to execute the task. After the first task, agents have to send the execution
context to the WFC. This context provides information about the progression of the
workflow. The WFC needs such information to be able to update its policy. In fact,
when a request is received from a workflow agent, the WFC has to communicate with the
PDP and steps 9-14 are executed for each communication between the WFC and workflow
agents. The execution context especially indicates about previous tasks that have been
accomplished. If we consider for example a workflow where a task T4 can be executed only
if task T1 has been executed successfully and then tasks T2 and T3 have been executed
in parallel and successfully, then the authorization is granted to agent executing T4 only
if the execution context holds and the WFC is informed about this.
Steps (16) and (17) show the functional communication between workflow agents. Blue
arrows show the requests for the authorization rules from the WFC.
(18) The last agent sends the workflow result to the WFC, and so the workflow exe-
cution completes.
If we consider that the execution of the workflow is centralized, the communication
between WFC and workflow agents to ask for authorizations will not exist. The WFC
will actually send the task and the authorization associated with the task execution to the
workflow agent and the agent will respond with the execution result. By receiving this
result the WFC will update its security policy and select the next agent depending on the
result of the task execution that he has received.
If we suppose that the security policy is managed using the provisioning approach, then
the WFC will have no idea about the security policy to be deployed during the workflow
execution. Also, workflow agents will communicate directly with the policy server to ask
for an authorization to execute their tasks. Thus, each workflow agent will have a Local
PEP (LPEP) and these LPEPs will communicate with the PDP present on the policy
server. In addition to information about their capabilities, LPEP have to communicate to
the PDP information about the workflow execution progress.
6.2 Inter-organizational case
With the inter-organizational case the same approach can be applied. The specification
environment still unchanged. In the enactment environment, communications are more
complicated. The WFC is replaced by the IWFC for the inter-organizational coordination
entity and each WFA is replaced by the WFC of each organization. Then, different
communications between organizations are done as described in section 5.2. Once the VO
is well formed, the IWFC of this VO communicates through its PEP with the PDP of the
policy server to request the policy decision. With the outsourcing approach this entity
will maintain the security of the inter-organizational workflow during its execution. If we
are in a provisioning approach, each organization has to implement its local PEP (LPEP).
This LPEP is used to communicate directly with the policy server without passing by the
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Fig. 5: Security policy deployment using an outsourcing approach
VO. This virtual organization will be useful just for the functional part of the workflow.
The next section section exemplifies the inter-organizational case to show the evolution of
the security policy during the workflow execution.
7 Case study: telesurgery
Telesurgery can be considered an interesting inter-organizational workflow. The applica-
tion includes at least two independent organizations; i.e. two hospitals, which have to
collaborate in order to achieve a common goal. This goal is generally to operate suc-
cessfully a patient. This application has to enforce precise temporal constraints when it is
executed. These constraints consist especially on the very precise parallelism requirements
to be enforced between the two sites connected to the application. In this example, we
suppose that we have a telesurgery operation between the hospital of New York and the
hospital of Strasbourg. The patient is located in the hospital of New York. This orga-
nization is composed of two sub_organizations: the robotic team and the medical team.
In the robotic team, the robot and a set of technicians will act. In the medical team,
assistants will survey the evolution of the patient state. The remote doctor is located in
Strasbourg hospital. This doctor will manage a surgical console which controls the move
of robot’s arms in the sub_organization "robotic team". The reproduction of the doctor
actions must be done with accuracy in real time by the robots’s arms. In the following, we
define the set of different elements of the application. The figure 6 shows a representation
of a simple and general workflow of principal activities to do during a telesurgery opera-
tion. The two states "S" and "E" represent respectively the initial and the end states of
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the workflow.
• Organizations = {Strasbourg_hospital, NewYork_hospital}
• Sub_organizations(NewYork_hospital) = {robotics_team, medical_team}
• Roles = {surgeon, assistant, technician, anaesthetist, robot}
• Views = {surgical_console, patient, medical_record, robot’s arms, video_display_terminal}
• Contexts = {bleeding, reaction_to_anaesthetic (RA), non_reaction_to_anaesthetic
(NRA)}
• Activities = {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, T10}
where T1 = Initialize robot’s arms, T2 = Create a working zone, T3 = Command the
surgical console, T4 = Reproduce the doctor actions on the console, T5 = Stop the action of
robot’s arms, T6 = Reanimate the patient, T7 = Supervise vital parameters of the patient,
T8 = Update the online information of the patient, T9 = Carry over the operation, T10 =
Supervise robot’s actions.
In this example we are especially interested in the enactment environment of figure 5.
We suppose that our workflow is well formed and that all constraints are not violated.
Numbers used in this section refer to different rows defined above in figure 5. In step 5,
the policy server will receive information about the workflow to specify its security policy.
This information is the assignment of different roles to different tasks within different
organizations. For this purpose, we use the function assignment(Org) to specify the set
of assignments done within Org during the workflow specification. This set is composed
of a quadruple (T, R, O, C) meaning that the task T has to be executed by the role R
using the object O and satisfying the conditions C. If there is no condition this field will
be empty represented by "-".. We can consider also that Org can be a sub_organization.
• assignment(Strasbourg_hospital) = {(T1, surgeon, surgical_console, -), (T2, sur-
geon, surgical_console, -), (T3, surgeon, surgical_console, -)}
• assignment(robotic_team) = {(T4, robot, robot’s arms, -), (T5, technician, robot’s
arms, bleeding), (T6, anaesthetist, patient, R.A)}
• assignment(medical_team) = {(T7, assistant, video_display_terminal, -), (T8, as-
sistant, medical_record, N.R.A), (T9, assistant, medical_record, -), (T10, assistant,
video_display_terminal, -)}
Using these assignments about the workflow specification, the policy server specifies
its abstract security policy using the API OrBAC. This policy describes permissions to
execute the different workflow tasks. So, the set of assignment is translated to the following
abstract security policy (SP):
SP = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10}
• R1 = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, surgeon, T1, surgical_console, default)
• R2 = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, surgeon, T2, surgical_console, default)
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Fig. 6: A simple workflow of a telesurgery operation
• R3 = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, surgeon, T3, surgical_console, default)
• R4 = (permission, robotic_team, robot, T4, robot’s arms, default)
• R5 = (permission, robotic_team, technician, T5, robot’s arms, "bleeding")
• R6 = (permission, robotic_team, anaesthetist, T6, patient, "R.A")
• R7 = (permission, medical_team, assistant, T7, video_display_terminal, default)
• R8 = (permission, medical_team, assistant, T8, medical_record, "N.R.A")
• R9 = (permission, medical_team, assistant, T9, medical_record, default)
• R10 = (permission, medical_team, assistant, T10, video_display_terminal, default)
In this policy we use the context "default" when there is no condition to satisfy when
executing the task. Also, we suppose in this case that the same subject executing the
task T7 must execute the task T6 (same_subject(T6, T7)). We notice that the Task T6 is
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executed within the sub-organization robotic_team and the Task T7 is executed within the
sub-organization medical_team. The order of execution of different tasks is represented in
figure 6. When the process enactment engine receives the workflow specification it starts
its user-role assignment for the execution of the workflow. In the following, we define
subjects that we assign to different roles:
• empower(Strasbourg_hospital, John, surgeon)
• empower(robotic_team, OurRobot, robot)
• empower(robotic_team, Alice, anaesthetist)
• empower(medical_team, Alice, assistant)
The PEP of the IWFC communicates with the PDP of the policy server to tell him
about the assignment that it has done. Combining this assignment with the abstract
security policy stored into the Policy Repository, the PIE generates the concrete policy.
This policy contains security rules defined with a default context, i.e. the set of permissions
to execute the workflow under normal and usual circumstances. This security policy is
defined as a set of concrete rules:
SP = {R1’, R2’, R3’, R4’, R7’, R8’, R10’}
• R1’ = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, John, T1, surgical_console, default)
• R2’ = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, John, T2, surgical_console, default)
• R3’ = (permission, Strasbourg_hospital, John, T3, surgical_console, default)
• R4’ = (permission, robotic_team, OurRobot, T4, robot’s arms, default)
• R7’ = (permission, medical_team, Alice, T7, video_display_terminal, default)
• R8’ = (permission, medical_team, Alice, T8, medical_record, "N.R.A")
• R10’ = (permission, medical_team, Alice, T10, video_display_terminal, default)
This security policy is managed by the IWFC. When the execution of the workflow
starts, each WFC must require the permissions to execute its different activities. This
request is done at the execution of each task of the workflow. Let us suppose that during
the execution of the workflow the context "R.A" is activated. In this case, the IWFC
is informed of this new event within the workflow. This entity must communicate with
the PDP of the server of the security policy. To generate the rule associated with this
event the PIE activates the abstract rule R6 defined under this context and other rules of
permitted activities related to this condition. It generates the following concrete rules R6’
with the active context "R.A" and the rule R9’. These rules are sent to the IWFC’s PEP.
It will relay them to the appropriate organization.
• R6’ = (permission, robotic_team, Alice, T6, patient, "R.A")
• R9’ = (permission, medical_team, Alice, T9, medical_record, default)
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We can notice that the rule R6’ implies an information flow control that the IWFC
has to manage. The subject Alice acting on the medical_team has to move to the
robotic_team when the context "R.A" is activated. This subject has the role assis-
tant in the medical_team organization and the role of anaesthetist in the robotic_team
sub_organization. The IWFC defines an information flow security rule to manage this
transition as explained in section 5.2.2. If we suppose that, to access this organization,
Alice has to clock in we can express this rule as follow: SR = (permission, VO,
medical_team, Enter, robotic_team, (clock_in, (reanimate, patient), com-
ing_from(medical_team))). This rule says that Alice will have only the permission
to reanimate the patient, when she moves to the robotic_team.
8 Conclusion
Several works have investigated security in WFMS since these systems present special
requirements of access and information flow control. They are characterized by a diversity
of tasks, roles, subjects and objects. But once the workflow security policy is defined
and specified, the workflow manager has to know how to deploy such a policy. In this
paper, we address the new issue of deploying a workflow security policy. We present
different approaches and modes to administrate the functional and the security part of a
workflow. Then, we introduce an approach to deploy the workflow security policy, once
it is defined and specified. This management is studied for two different cases: intra
and inter organizational workflows. For the first case we have defined functionalities that
different entities (WFC, PEP and PDP) must manage. This case is implemented through
calls to the OrBAC API which is responsible for defining the workflow security policy.
For the second case a more rigorous control is needed since communications between
independent organizations are required. Thus, a virtual organization must be created to
control the synchronization and the communication between different organizations. The
VO is responsible for ensuring the non violation of workflow constraints and managing
the transition between domains of workflow subjects. In both cases, the security policy
is based on the OrBAC model to specify the workflow security policy. The last section
exemplifies the inter-organizational case through the telesurgery application. In this work
we assume that organizations involved in the workflow belong to some trust alliance that
provides some degree of confidence between the different parts of an inter-organizational
workflow. If a trust alliance does not exist we have to resort to a trust server who will
be responsible for controlling the whole workflow execution. In a forthcoming paper, we
intend to go in details of the implementation of the intra and inter organizational case.
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